Airline Deregulation
From Public Darling to Media Scapegoat
by clifford winston
cliff winston is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Market Corrections not Government Interventions (SpringerNature, 2025).
Published November 17, 2026
Barring the unforeseen, the recent nationwide FAA ground stop that forced the cancellation of more than 20,000 airline flights in the US and stranded 1.5 million passengers won’t be repeated anytime soon. But dollars to doughnuts, in coming weeks winter storms along with an operational meltdown or two will scramble flight schedules, leaving travelers to sleep on terminal floors — and the national media will dutifully publish a flurry of guest essays and editorials assigning blame. Almost without exception, their chosen villain will be airline deregulation.
If you are a regular reader of The New York Times, The Atlantic or any number of other publications, you know the narrative: whenever severe weather cancels a bunch of flights, a low-cost carrier enters bankruptcy or some other unforeseen event tips the balance to travelers’ distress, pundits demand that the government step in and reregulate the airlines. The irony here is that the fault (when there is a reparable fault) is not too little regulation, but too much.
Far from being a failure, the deregulation of domestic air travel in 1978 stands as one of the most successful economic policy achievements in American history. The travel nightmares we dread are real, but are not the fault of competitive markets. Where they are not truly exceptional events – hurricanes, pandemics and the like – they are mostly the predictable consequence of government’s failure to allow foreign airlines to compete in domestic U.S. markets, its continuing tolerance of public airport monopolies and its abject failure to modernize the air traffic control system and expand its capacity.
Job Well Done
Before digging into today’s discontent, it is vital to recall what air travel looked like under the heavy hand of the federal regulators at the Civil Aeronautics Board. Before 1978, the CAB dictated both the routes airlines could fly and the fares they could charge. The agency in effect operated as a government-enforced cartel that protected incumbents, barred new entrants and outlawed price competition. Because airlines could not compete on price, they competed on costly frills – empty middle seats, steak and lobster dinners, piano lounges – passing on the costs to travelers and reserving air travel almost exclusively for the affluent and those on corporate expense accounts.
Decades of empirical research demonstrates that ending this regime transformed American mobility. My 2023 book with Jia Yan and others summarized the good news:
Affordability. Adjusted for inflation and inclusive of all ancillary baggage and reservation fees, the average fare in the United States had dropped by more than 60 percent since 1980.
Democratization of Mobility. Flying is no longer solely for the affluent. By 2020, 87 percent of adult Americans had taken a commercial flight. The comparable figure in the early 1970s, when regulation was still in effect, was less than 50 percent.
Route Connectivity. Rather than abandoning communities, the commercial networks created by unregulated airlines expanded access dramatically. A record 90 percent of the nation's top 2,000 domestic city-pair markets now enjoy nonstop service, up from under 70 percent in 1990.
Discount Competition. In spite of the loss of Spirit Airlines to bankruptcy, nearly 90 percent of the U.S. population has direct access to a low-cost, no-frills carrier.
Safety. While critics in the 1970s warned that competition would force airlines to cut corners on maintenance, commercial aviation’s safety record actually improved.
Customer Sentiment. Despite the steady stream of negative stories in the press, consumer sentiment indexes – such as the American Customer Satisfaction Index – have climbed steadily since their inception in the 1990s, registering multidecade highs exceeding 75 percent.
New discount carriers took flight, hub-and-spoke networks opened up more convenient travel between second- and third-tier destinations, and millions of less-affluent Americans took to the skies for the first time.
From Public Darling to Media Scapegoat
Given this overwhelmingly positive empirical record, why the constant grousing about deregulation? The problem is that showing deregulation was a master stroke of public policy requires you to construct a counterfactual in which you ask what air travel would look like had deregulation never occurred.
The first misunderstanding occurred in the aftermath of airline deregulation when the industry suffered steep financial losses during the deep 1981-82 recession. Early skeptics jumped to declare deregulation a disaster, confusing the impact of a macroeconomic downturn and spiking jet fuel prices with a structural failure of competition. Once the economy recovered, the benefits of market liberalization became undeniable: new discount carriers took flight, hub-and-spoke networks opened up more convenient travel between second- and third-tier destinations, and millions of less-affluent Americans took to the skies for the first time.
When Steven Morrison and I assessed the first decade of regulatory reform, we invoked Frank Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life as analogy. Just as Clarence the Angel showed George Bailey the dystopian fate that Bedford Falls would have suffered had he never been born, we explained what air travel would have looked like had deregulation never occurred. Tens of millions of passengers flying today would have been priced out entirely, stuck driving on crowded highways or not going at all. But when air travel was affected by weather, computer outages and the like – what the lawyers call “force majeure” – deregulation became George Bailey, unfairly blamed for every missed flight.
The Real Culprits
Delays and Cancellations. When severe weather disrupts airline operations, critics point to capitalism unbridled. Yet giving federal bureaucrats, however well intentioned, the power to assign routes and fares could not fix buggy airline scheduling software or prevent blizzards from transforming airports into ice-skating rinks. To the degree that cascading delays are anyone’s fault, it’s the FAA’s because it still rations overloaded airspace and runway access through administrative delays rather than using efficient and practical peak-period congestion pricing. Moreover, public airport authorities do not price scarce runway capacity during peak hours the way Uber imposes surge pricing on holiday weekends, leaving runway slots to be rationed by queues rather than prices.
Technological Stagnation in Air Traffic Control. Aviation safety has excelled – but in spite of the fact that the air traffic control system remains tethered to 1950s-era ground-based radar instead of advanced satellite navigation. Taxpayers have poured tens of billions into the FAA’s decades-long NextGen modernization, which remains chronically behind schedule and over budget. This technological lag constrains airspace capacity, limits airlines’ operations and price competition, and drives unnecessary flight delays. The fault lies not with airlines, which are eager to deploy modern digital avionics, but with an archaic government bureaucracy.
Hub Dominance and Municipal Airport Monopolies. Critics frequently lament that legacy carriers have created “fortress hubs” allowing them to extract higher fares on thin, nonhub routes. But this dominance is often protected by municipal governments, not free markets. While air travel has expanded explosively, new airports have not been built for decades. Instead, those airports operate as public monopolies whose gates are locked up via exclusive-use leases to incumbent airlines, creating “moats” to competitor access.
The Plight of Ultra-Low-Cost Carriers. When carriers like Spirit encounter financial distress, interventionists claim that major airlines’ frequent flyer programs give them an unfair leg up that merits intervention. This misreads the market dynamics. The competitive efficacy of loyalty programs benefits from the networks of larger carriers that fly just about anywhere. But those benefits to travelers are real, no less valid than the benefits underlying brand-preference efficiencies in marketing that make Toyotas easier to market than Lucids or Rivians.
Spirit struggled because its unit operating costs escalated by more than 40 percent, eroding its cost advantage, while legacy carriers adapted by offering unbundled “basic economy” fares to those willing to sit in a middle seat and not check luggage. In a competitive market, inefficient business models reorganize or fail; investors bear that risk, sparing taxpayers and consumers from funding subsidized inefficiency.
Because the flying public is not faced with the inflated fares and restricted networks they would endure under a reregulated regime, pundits and critics have been rarely challenged in making deregulation the scapegoat for many air travel problems.
Completing Deregulation
The fix to most contemporary air travel problems is to introduce competition to the parts of the aviation ecosystem that remain trapped in the public sector.
Grant Cabotage Rights. A $10 word with a straightforward meaning. U.S. law strictly forbids foreign-owned carriers from flying domestic routes. But granting low-cost efficient carriers like Ryanair or EasyJet “cabotage rights” to serve U.S. city pairs would inject powerful downward pressure on fares and discipline legacy carriers, especially on underserved routes. This would have the added procompetitive effect of addressing hub dominance, where single carriers effectively control airports, including Atlanta (Delta), Dallas (American), Charlotte (American), Minneapolis (Delta) and Newark (United). To the benefit of travelers in Europe, discount carriers led by Ryanair and EasyJet have made end runs around “fortress hubs” by flying to secondary airports – for example, Beauvais, Porto, Bergamo and Pisa. It’s a safe bet they’d try the same tactics in the U.S.
Privatize Commercial Airports. Transitioning commercial airports from municipal agencies to private, profit-seeking operators would put an end to the cartelization of gates. Private airports have strong economic incentives to maximize throughput by attracting new carriers, pricing runway slots efficiently and expanding terminal capacity.
Corporatize Air Traffic Control. The United States should follow the proven model of Canada and dozens of European nations by converting air traffic control into a self-funded, independent nonprofit entity. Freed from federal procurement rigidities and congressional budget volatility, an independent operator could rapidly deploy satellite tracking and modern routing algorithms while preserving rigorous safety oversight. Corporatizing this system would replace federal inertia with a commercially accountable entity capable of expanding airspace capacity and eliminating unnecessary delays.
The Peril of Forgetting the “What If”
A fundamental problem with assessing airline deregulation today is the absence of an ongoing, real-time counterfactual. Because the flying public is not faced with the inflated fares and restricted networks they would endure under a reregulated regime, pundits and critics have been rarely challenged in making deregulation the scapegoat for many air travel problems.
Generally, the media likes to hold the government accountable. But it has often done so in air travel by perversely treating deregulation as the villain. By elevating antimarket arguments lacking plausible positive counterfactuals, the press obscures the true sources of travelers’ discontent: a lack of fully open competition and chronic government mismanagement of airports and air traffic control.
Our best hope is for a modern-day Clarence to emerge among policymakers – a leader with the skill and motivation to complete the liberalization process. The failure to do so will not just empower those tempted by fixes that can be explained in a sentence, it will leave the flying public shortchanged by the very government interventions meant to save them.